The contributions of Pavel Florensky (1882–1937), Russia’s answer to Leonardo da Vinci, span mathematics, physics, art, and religious thought. Central to his theory of knowledge is the conception of moral evil, which he interprets through a Platonic lens. This essay examines the coherence and implications of Florensky’s theology of sin, that is, hamartiology, as predicated upon a distinctly Platonist foundation.

Florensky, following Vladimir Solovyov and the Slavophile tradition, adopts a Platonic view of reality as hierarchical, whereby the material world reflects a higher realm of immutable Forms or Ideas. He perceives the visible world as a symbolic manifestation of deeper spiritual truths, where every material entity reflects a higher divine reality. In this framework, sin disrupts the harmonious reflection between the material and the divine (1) It introduces a distortion, breaking the symbolic correspondence as ontological rupture. This perspective aligns with Plato's degradation of the material world untethered from the Forms. To Florensky, sin is not merely a moral failing but a fundamental disconnectedness from the divine order.

Predicated upon Plato's idea of the isolated self, separated from the ideal forms, Florensky’s framework locates sin as the division of the self from divine reality. In this schema, echoing Plato’s notion of divided androgynous beings in the Symposium, can be understood in terms of the soul's fall into self-centeredness can be seen as a Platonic “fall” from unity into division.(2) Sin is presented as the force that renders the rationality of the world and God absurd, insofar as language here is not merely a medium of communication but reflects the broken state of being caused by sin.(3) For example, the root word for Hades, Aidou, meaning “the invisible,” reflects how sin obscures truth and reality, keeping individuals isolated in their own self-imposed blindness—a foundation for the Johannine conception of self-deception.(4) 

Contrasting with Western thought influenced by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas—where sin is seen as an aberration of Natural Moral Law—Florensky emphasizes sin as a disruption of being itself. (5) In his view, sin disintegrates the original harmony established by God, leading to a state of fragmentation. This ontological perspective underscores the gravity of sin beyond ethical considerations, highlighting its impact on the very nature of existence. Florensky's approach is predicated upon Platonic thought insofar as it emphasizes the importance of returning to the source of truth and being. Sin, therefore, is a deviation from the true reality, causing a separation that only reconciliation with the divine can heal.  

Florensky's theology underscores the paradoxical nature of sin as both rational and irrational. He notes that God “hath scattered the proud by nothing else than the thought of their hearts” (Luke 1:51), indicating that rationality, when divorced from divine wisdom, becomes a manifestation of selfhood and pride.(6) Here, Florensky reflects Dostoevsky’s assertion that “reason bears within itself the seeds of destruction.”(7) Florensky distinguishes between reason, which is harmonious with divine truth, and rationality, which is self-referential and isolating. He asserts that “sin is that which removes the possibility of grounding and, therefore, explanation, i.e., the possibility of reasonableness.” (8) Sin manifests as an over-intellectualization that starves consciousness of the “oxygenating reason inherent in all being.” (9) This leads to a cessation of intellectual seeing, where individuals become blind to deeper truths. 

Florensky equates this distorted rationality with devilry, describing the Devil-Mephistopheles as “naked rationality” insofar as he embodies rationality devoid of divine grounding, leading to absurdity and meaninglessness, serves as a caution against the idolatry of reason. (10) Moreover, by relying solely on self-contained rationality, individuals render God's creation and God Himself absurd, stripping reality of its depth and reducing everything to a “single plane”—flat and vulgar. According to Florensky, sin is the immersion in oneself, where the individual asserts “I = I” without relation to God or others. (11) This echoes Plato's idea of the isolated self separated from the ideal Forms. In the “Symposium,” Plato describes how the original androgynous beings were split, resulting in a perpetual longing for wholeness. Florensky applied this to moral evil, whereby sin—as the division of the self from divine reality— equates to the fall from unity into fragmentation. This self-centeredness leads to a loss of relationality and a disconnection from the communal aspects of existence. Sin isolates individuals, causing them to perceive themselves as autonomous entities rather than interconnected parts of a divine order. This perspective reinforces the Platonic and Christian emphasis on the importance of relational being and the dangers of solipsism.  

For Florensky, language—beyond mere communication—is a reflection of being. Sin corrupts and distorts language, transforming it into a means of obscuring truth rather than revealing it. This concept of double voiced confession and obscured addresivity links Florensky to Bahktinian theory, and to the Johannine notion of self-deception, where those in sin are unable to perceive the light of truth. Indeed, Florensky warns that the Devil, as an “expert flatterer” and the “Father of Lies,” ensnares individuals in illusory wisdom. This false wisdom deflects them from genuine understanding, perpetuating the cycle of sin and isolation. By distorting language and meaning, sin undermines the very foundations of comprehension and relationality. Florensky concludes that “sin is a principle of unreason, a principle of incomprehensibility and of a dull, insuperable cessation of intellectual seeing.” (12) Since the Devil is an “expert flatterer”—the Father of Lies—he traps us in illusory wisdom, thereby deflecting us from genuine wisdom.(13) 

Florensky's use of Platonism to support his theology of sin is convincing in several ways. Firstly, it provides a robust metaphysical framework that deepens the understanding of sin's impact on reality. By framing sin as an ontological rupture, Florensky moves beyond ethical categories to address the fundamental disorder introduced by sin into the cosmos. Secondly, his integration of Platonic concepts such as the hierarchy of being, the symbolic nature of reality, and the significance of unity and division enriches his theological discourse. It allows for a nuanced exploration of how sin affects not only individuals but the entire created order. Thirdly, Florensky's critique of rationality resonates with historical philosophical concerns about the limits of reason when detached from transcendent truth.  

Comparing Florensky's views with those of Western theologians highlights the distinctiveness of his approach. While Aquinas sought to harmonize faith and reason, viewing sin as a violation of natural law discernible through rationality, Florensky emphasizes the insufficiency of rationality without divine grounding. His Platonic orientation leads him to prioritize the mystical and symbolic over the purely rational. Moreover, Florensky's thought intersects with Eastern Orthodox theology's emphasis on theosis—the process of becoming more like God. Sin, in this context, hinders the soul's journey towards union with the divine. His Platonic framework complements this theology by providing a metaphysical basis for understanding the soul's ascent and the obstacles posed by sin. 

Despite the strengths of Florensky's Platonic approach, one concern is the potential for Manichean dualism to conflict with the Christian affirmation of the goodness of the material world. If the material is merely a distorted reflection of the divine, there is a risk of devaluing creation—a position antithetical to the Incarnation, where the divine becomes perfected materiality in Christ. Additionally, Florensky's stark opposition between reason and rationality risks oversimplifying the complex interplay of faith and reason. By associating rationality exclusively with sin and the Devil, Florensky inadvertently downplays the positive role of human intellect in spiritual growth. Herein lies the paradox of the visionary polymath and pioneer of integral knowledge: despite contributing to multiple fields of knowledge, Florensky was convinced that knowledge itself, untethered from the divine source, bore within itself the seed and species of moral evil.  

NOTES

1. Florensky, The Pillar and Ground of the Truth, 150-1. 

2. Plato, Symposium, trans. Benjamin Jowett, in The Dialogues of Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892), 189c, 190a–190b. 

3. Florensky, The Pillar and Ground of the Truth, 142-3. 

4. Ibid., 144. 

5. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), I-II, Q. 71, Art. 6. 

6. Florensky, The Pillar and Ground of the Truth, 130. 

7. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Demons, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Vintage, 1995), 412. 

8. Florensky, The Pillar and Ground of the Truth, 131. 

9. Ibid., 132. 

10. Ibid., 133. 

11. Ibid., 140. 

12. Ibid., 137. 

13. Ibid., 138.