A century-old Kurdish struggle continues in four nation-states, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, based on fundamental principles such as claiming recognition of their identity, Kurdistan as their ancestral land, their unique language and culture, and the right to self-determination. Kurdish self-determination claims echo indigenous peoples’ struggles, which were recognized by the UN in 2007 as one of the important rights of indigenous people under international law. By focusing on the differences between ethnicity and indigeneity, this paper highlights the indigenousness of Kurds, who have either been widely viewed as ethnic minorities in the Middle East or whose existence has been denied.

Introduction

This article, first, discusses the differences between the concepts of indigeneity and ethnicity. 

It is important to clarify these concepts in order to understand the implications of national and international laws on indigenous peoples and the Kurds. Although indigenous matters have been a viable subject globally since the late 1960s, the Oxford Dictionary does not have a definition of ‘indigeneity’, though it defines indigenous, ethnicity and autochthonous as follows: 

• Indigenous: originating or occurring naturally in a particular place; native.

• Ethnicity: status in respect of membership of a group regarded as ultimately of common descent, or having a common national or cultural tradition; ethnic character.

• Autochthonous: (of an inhabitant of a place) indigenous rather than descended from migrants or colonists (1). 

There is general agreement that the colonial era had a severe impact on indigenous peoples in terms of administrative practices, including implementing special laws to segregate, assimilate and oppress (2). It is  also argued  that colonialism not only massively traumatised the colonised nations but has also maintained its control in different forms stated as, “Colonialism does not end, except in a legal sense, as the effects of colonisation are enduring for both the colonisers and the colonised” (3). Whilst colonial practice towards indigenous peoples had already been established within the context of settler colonialism, it has also existed within heterogeneous societies towards unrecognized indigenous peoples. Heterogeneous societies where the internal colony is defined were founded as nation-states by privileging ethnic and religious groups that deny other, pre-existing native communities. This concept, therefore, is considered to be a critical perspective when looking at indigenous matters. While discussions surrounding concepts of ethnicity and indigeneity remain important within academia, Trigger and Dalley claimed that “critical definitions argue for a clear differentiation between indigeneity and either race or ethnicity, with a specific category of indigenous peoples deserving of distinctive rights and interests” (4). Therefore, the indigenous rights movement has had a significant impact on the differentiation between indigeneity and ethnicity and “paved the way for Indigenous Peoples to refuse to be considered simply as ethnic minorities within a nation-state” (5). Denial of indigenous peoples within nation-states is often justified by the assumption of a threat to a state’s sovereignty. 

In particular, the differentiation between ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples is significant in terms of the rights granted under international law. The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, henceforth United Nations Minorities Declaration (1992), recognises minorities’ existence and their efforts to guarantee their rights to non-discrimination and equality, promotes multicultural and intercultural education nationally and locally, promotes their participation in all aspects of public life. On the other hand, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (6) is clear about including all the rights granted to ethnic minorities, adding indigenous peoples’ self-determination rights and rights to access and have control over the natural resources of their lands. 

According to indigenous studies, self-determination claims among indigenous peoples are still controversial and occur in different ways (7; 8). The debate revolves more around state sovereignty. The concept of self-determination may not have exactly the same meaning in Indigenous studies as it does in Kurdish politics, but there are striking similarities. Also, when it comes to indigenousness, self-determination takes many forms. Further, claiming land and cultural rights along with the right to self-determination does not necessarily mean political separation (9). When the Kurdish movement re-emerged from the 1960s onwards to pursue the demands of the Kurds, the influence of a leftist ideology was clearly visible in the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the PKK (10). Even though the pro-Kurdish parties included in this research do not make secessionist claims, they have been accused of being linked to the PKK. 

On this point, analysing the Kurdish struggle for self-determination, their demands and the response of the state appear strikingly similar to indigenous struggles. Since the Turkish state denies the Kurds their rights, including recognition of their identity, equal representation and, especially, self-determination, it has been extremely challenging for the Kurds to claim their fundamental rights. Not being recognized by the Turkish judicial system, the Kurds are criminalized as long as their fundamental rights claim is interpreted as a threat to Turkish unity (11). Although since the late 1990s, the underlying ideology of self-determination has shifted from a [more radical] vision of a united, democratic Kurdistan to a form of autonomy (12), now even the autonomy demand is used as a reason to oppress Kurdish struggle.   Considering the Turkish state is regarded as a form of democracy in the region, its founding principles are contradictory, which results in the criminalization of Kurds’ self-determination claim. On the one hand, as a democratic regime, it involves some political representations of various ideologies, such as liberal/conservative, social democracy, the nationalist/radical right and Islamism. On the other hand, it rejects some groups that: 

…it considers a threat to the ‘nation’ or to its founding elements: the Kurds (who form the major linguistically distinct non-Turkish group) and the Alevis (who form the major non-Sunni group, i. e. a group which does not belong to the par defeat State’s religion) (13). 

The constitution of 1982, article 66, states that: “Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk” (14) that was accepted only ethnic identity. The denial of Kurdish identity emerged after the Independence War of Turkey. It is evident that not only was the existence of the Kurds known and recognized before the Republic but also, between 1919 and 1922, Turks and Kurds were allies during the independence war (15).  The Kurds' struggle for self-determination has existed since the last periods of the Ottoman Empire. It has continued in different forms, such as uprisings, rebellions and guerrilla movements since the establishment of the republic. The political ideology that reaches today's parliamentary representation of the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) started with the establishment of the pro-Kurdish party in 1990. Since then, there have been eight pro-Kurdish political parties by following legal procedures to found a political party in Turkey. As the first pro-Kurdish political party in Turkey, Halkin Emek Partisi (HEP, or People’s Labour Party) that was founded on 7 June 1990 had a ground-breaking impact by “promoting formal recognition of the Kurdish people as its central political platform” (16), which was a new situation for the Turkish parliament. 

Indigeneity and Discourse about Kurdishness: The Kurdish Political Movement in Turkey

In this paper, I look at the experiences of the Kurds from an indigeneity perspective, which were studied by analysing the ideological journey of their self-determination claim during the period from the 1970s to 2018, which has been studied through pro-Kurdish political party programs since the 1990s, statements on Kurdish matters by the two newest pro-Kurdish political parties (Peace and Democratic Party [BDP] and Peoples’ Democracy Party [HDP]), and interviews with deputies of the HDP. Diagram 1, below, presents how the main principles of indigeneity, such as self-identification, culture and language, historical land and self-determination claims, have been expressed within the Kurdish political movement in Turkey.

Self-identification of Indigeneity and Kurdishness: Pre-existence Claims of an Autochthonous Nation of Mesopotamia and Primary Constituent of the Republic of Turkey

In my research, I examine the significance of the concept of self-identification and show why self-identification is an essential principle of indigeneity and the Kurdish political movement. The analysis was based on two main categories of identification of Kurdish identity. Then, the analysis was structured based on the institutional language of pro-Kurdish party programs and individual interpretations within interviews conducted with deputies of the HDP. 

An analysis of the institutional language used in political party programs and statements shows that these documents adopt official language that avoids ‘we’ meaning Kurds, with only one exception, the founding manifesto of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The founding manifesto of the PKK has been paid particular attention due to the difference in its language in comparison to later pro-Kurdish political parties. Whilst the founding manifesto of the PKK presents a strong self-identification of Kurdishness, such as ‘our nation’, ‘our country’ and ‘our people’, referring to the Kurds and Kurdistan, pro-Kurdish political party programs illustrate the identification of Kurdishness based on dominant recognition and advocacy for Kurds, such as the ‘Kurdish issue’ or the ‘Kurdish problem’. For example:

Our Party advocates for peace, equality and a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue. Additionally, it defends Turkey's multi-identity, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual nature, and ensures that all identities are protected and provided sources without discrimination or oppression. As a central principle, it acknowledges that all our citizens have the right to be free and equal citizenship under the law (17).

The second form of self-identification is through individual expressions and interpretations of a Kurdish national identity. Here, one should consider a broader aspect in the definition of Kurdish identity by emphasizing the existence and recognition of the Kurds and their rights. The historical and legal implications appear significant in the discursive identification of Kurdishness. It is important to note that both autochthonous ('kadim' in Turkish) and primary constituent ('asli unsur' in Turkish) narratives make reference to having existed before the creation of the Turkish State. Whereas ‘kadim halk’ (‘autochthonous peoples’) implies being an ancient nation in the Middle East (Mesopotamia), a ‘asli unsur’ (‘primary constituent’) is defined as being a partner in the process of founding the Republic of Turkey. Furthermore, an ‘kadim halk’ (‘autochthonous nation’) is an even stronger claim of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey because it implies the expansion of both the history and historical land claims of the Kurds in the region (18). As deputy Lezgin Botan of the HDP stated in an interview:

As Kurds, we are not a minority in the Middle East. In the first place, we are talking about a nation with a population of between 40 and 45 million people. The second reason is that we are not a nation that came here afterwards (19). 

In what follows, I further elaborate on the significance of self-identification for a collective identity of both indigenousness in general and Kurdishness in particular. Self-identification as indigenous and the simultaneous refusal to define oneself as an ethnic minority are prominent elements in the construction of Kurdish national identity. 

Culture and Language: Kurdish as a Mother Tongue

While language is one of the core components of a nation and a national identity, the aspect indigenousness is particularly important. Scholars suggest that the link between language and nationality dates back to ancient times: “In Ancient Greece, those who did not speak Greek were labelled “barbarians” (20) or Biblical times: “Holy people, Holy land, Holy language” (21). Building on the significance of language for a national identity, Kurdish has also been described as a pre-existing, ‘rooted’ and rich language. As regards education, all the other aspects of practising a mother language are also defined as fundamental rights by the Kurdish movement (22). Data suggest that the Kurdish political movement has been demanding language rights, although the Turkish state has imposed assimilation practices, since the foundation of the state. “So when a language group fights to preserve its language, it is never just preserving a tool for communication.” It also preserves national identities, cultural products, and autonomous institutions (23).

Analysis of the data shows how Kurdish is identified as the ‘mother language’ by representatives of the Kurdish political movement. It also discusses the politico-cultural aspect of Kurdish, which includes how it has been oppressed and experienced assimilation practices and become one of the crucial demands of the Kurdish political movement. During our meeting on 21 February 2018, International Mother Language Day, deputy İmam Taşçıer of the HDP expressed his opinion on Kurdish as the mother language and the restrictions applied by the state:

Today is World Mother Tongue Day, but as a parliamentarian, I cannot speak my own mother tongue in parliament. Even if I do, my language is recorded as ‘x’ instead of Kurdish. It says just ‘x’, not even a language, any language, just ‘x’ (24). 

It therefore illustrates how demanding language rights is one of the fundamental claims of the Kurdish political movement. For example: 

Education in one’s mother tongue is a fundamental right for everyone. Our party aims for free use of the mother language in the public sphere and all stages of education and to provide community services to citizens in their mother language. (25) 

In sum, Kurdish is identified as the mother language of the Kurds and language rights have been a key demand of the Kurdish political movement. While the growing support for pro-Kurdish political parties and European Union membership negotiations with the Turkish state in the early 2000s led to a more flexible environment for Kurdish language and culture, this has changed since 2011. 

Homeland/Historical Land: Kurdistan as a Historical Homeland

The notion of a homeland as a critical theme of indigeneity is crucial in separating the categories of ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples. That is, the importance of history and the spiritual bond to the homeland is the core factor of indigenousness. Indigeneity discourse emerged based on indigenous peoples demanding recognition of their history in the particular territory that colonisers or current states no longer have. The perception of this concept varies among indigenous communities, depending on the structural differences between current states. That is, indigenous peoples in colonial settler states (Australia, Canada, the United States of America and New Zealand) experience different struggles than the indigenous peoples of Latin America, South-East Asia or Africa (26). More importantly, even on the same continent, indigenous peoples might have a different experience depending on the host state’s approach to indigenous matters.

Working in Western NGOs within global indigenous rights movements made me aware that a sense of belonging and emotional connection to one’s native land is a vital apart of indigenous struggles. Although intergovernmental institutions (the International Labour Organisation [ILO] and the United Nations [UN]) addressed indigenous rights in 1957, 1989 and 2007, being profoundly influenced by indigenous rights movements, the majority of indigenous peoples are still struggling due to land claims that cause conflicts with host states. Recognised states see the motherland claims of indigenous peoples as a threat to their sovereignty, but for indigenous peoples this is a matter that goes beyond legal recognition. It involves the recognition of ancestral roots and spiritual bonds. For example, the Aboriginal people of Australia are among the indigenous peoples still struggling for their rights and their homeland, as: “Homeland communities hold the language, the culture” (27). Another example of this perception of land is described by an Aboriginal scholar, “No English words are good enough to give a sense of the links between an Aboriginal group and its homeland [...]. Our word ‘land’ is too spare and meagre” (28). 

Building on the perception of a homeland for indigenous peoples, the perception of a homeland for the Kurds within the Kurdish political movement appears strikingly similar to the indigenous perception of land following the discussion of a Kurdish identity, as well as language and culture. Analysis of three genres of data indicates that historical ties and recognizing the unity of all parts of Kurdistan are constitutive elements of the discourse about a homeland by the Kurdish political movement. As the deputy of HDP Ali Atalan’s statement continued:

Among Kurds, regardless of area, there is an independent ‘we are Kurds, no matter’ feeling without distinction of east, west, north or south in response to essential incidents and important developments. For example, in Afrin, or Kobane, Halabja and Sincar, that is, developments have become something that got the Kurds together emotionally and politically (29). 

Deputy Sibel Yiğitalp of the HDP also emphasises the unity of all parts of the homeland in terms of shared cultural and historical values: 

We have a common language and a common, more correctly, unity, we have a collective historical unity; we have a collective cultural unity. That is, borders are not decisive for us at all (30).  

Since this paper illustrates homeland narrative through a Turkey-based Kurdish political movement, the Turkish part of Kurdistan that is also defined as North Kurdistan (Bakur in Kurdish) has been the focus of the paper. Although the word ‘Kurdistan’ is banned by the Turkish government, the members of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey are still determined to use it, though they define the region in other ways as well. That includes the Kurdish region, Kurdish cities and Kurdish municipalities, and another important way is through the particular issues that Kurds have been facing in the region. These include state emergency rule, assimilation, forced displacement and underdevelopment of the region, which are suggested as Turkish state practices to oppress and assimilate the Kurds in the region, as in east and southeast Turkey (previously defined as the Kurdish region). Apart from the Turkey-based discussion, a significant part of the homeland argument in the discourse about Kurdishness is the ‘wholeness’ of Kurdistan, as opposed to the post-First World War division by political borders. 

In sum, in addition to the previous indigeneity themes (self-identification and language/culture), the Kurds’ strong sense of belonging to a particular territory identified as Kurdistan appears to be a significant part of the discourse about Kurdishness. The identification of Kurdistan as a homeland is based on the argument of historical facts of pre-existence and recognition, an emotional bond to the land and, lastly, ongoing kinship relations that have existed longer than current political borders. 

Self-determination claim: Decentralised/democratic autonomy governance model

The history of the self-determination struggle of the Kurds dates back to the terminal stage of the Ottoman Empire. Since then, the struggle has appeared in various forms, such as rebellion, uprising, guerrilla movements and, lastly, parliamentary politics. Diagram 2, below, illustrates the main stages of formation of the self-determination claim. Here, the shift from an ‘independent united democratic Kurdistan’ to a decentralised (‘adem-i merkeziyetçi’) governance model of a ‘democratic nation’, defined as self-rule model of governance, has been traced from the establishing of the PKK to the current parliamentary pro-Kurdish political party.  

The model of decentralised governance requires active citizen participation in local government and has remained the core idea behind the self-determination claim. A critical development in the Kurdish political movement was the introduction of the ideas of ‘democratic autonomy’ and ‘democratic confederalism’ as the central pillars of self-determination claims. These models, which are often used interchangeably (31), enable local people to participate in local decision-making processes and provide equal opportunities for people with different ethnic and religious backgrounds. The proposed system defines democratic autonomy as “a re-grounding of the political status of people, on the basis of self-government rather than on peoples’ relations with the state”. Besides that, “democratic confederalism aims at the strengthening of local administrative capacities organized in the form of councils at the very local level, of streets and then neighbourhood, through district/village and town/city to region” (32). In other words, democratic confederalism is a form of self-governance in which autonomy is organized. 

The first appearance of these concepts in a party program was in the program of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), followed by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and, lastly, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). The concepts of ‘democratic confederalism’ and ‘democratic autonomy’ in the suggested governance model are based on the decentralised principle.

Considering that the self-determination claim by indigenous peoples is still one of the most debated notions, not only in academia and international law but also within the Kurdish political movement in Turkey, I will discuss how this notion is expressed within the Kurdish political movement. My data indicate two central self-determination claims: first, an independent united democratic Kurdistan; and second, a decentralised governance model that has also been referred to as ‘democratic confederalism’. The first claim was presented in the founding manifesto of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers ‘Party Programme) that emerged in the 1978. There, the ideological view of the PKK was in line with other liberal nationalist movements around the world (33). The second model of self-determination I analysed pro-Kurdish political parties’ programs, statements and interviews.

My findings indicate that, in the 1990s, pro-Kurdish political parties’ self-determination claim moved away from a nationalist form of movement. Although the self-determination claim of the Kurdish political movement has evolved during the last four decades, two main demands of the movement, constitutional recognition (equal citizenship) and cultural rights (education in the mother language in particular), have remained sacrosanct. Thus, the new self-determination claim has been characterised by a new political agenda concerned with strengthening local government. According to this latter self-determination claim, which has been recognized above as a decentralised governing model, control by the state over local government and elected officials will be abolished, and authorisation will be assigned to local people. This model, during the 2000s, developed into democratic autonomy/confederalism, which was introduced by the jailed leader of the PKK after reading about Murray Bookchin’s governance model based on active citizen participation. 

Deputy Alican Önlü of the HDP commented on the interdiscursivity between discourses of indigeneity and Kurdishness. The deputy stated:

What is self-governing by locals? They want to manage themselves with their own locality, history, language. We do not say that is entirely right, it may be very backward, it may be very incomplete, and it may not be appropriate for the twentieth or twenty-first centuries, but that is their problem. (34)

Deputy Ahmet Yıldırım of the HDP also clarified his position on the suggested governance model. 

We, as party, have put democratic autonomy and decentralisation in the party programme and rules. We, as a party, defend the democratic autonomy of local parliaments and local administrations. (35) 

Moreover, this proposed governance model defends the rights of other forgotten or denied peoples in the region’s nation-states and paves the way for them to be involved in the decision-making process. One interpretation of the advocated model is as follows: 

The radical democracy or direct democracy model reminds me a little bit of a honeycomb. As you look at a honeycomb, you’ll see thousands of tiny pores. Each pore is filled with nectar from a different flower. It is important to note that all the pores are horizontal, which does not involve a hierarchy. (36)

My findings clearly indicates that the representatives of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey refused to be defined as an ethnic minority even though there is no constitutional recognition of Kurds as such. As discussed earlier, Kurds identify themselves as one of the autochthonous or ancient peoples of Mesopotamia and Anatolia. Pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey recognise the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious nature of Turkey in their programs and active politics. the current elected pro-Kurdish party founded as the 'Peoples' Democracy Party (HDP)' is the first political party in Turkey's politics, referring to the multi-ethnic nature of Turkey. By proposing the self-government model (democratic autonomy and democratic confederalism), they also protect the rights and demands of Kurds and other ancient peoples, whose presence in Anatolia and Mesopotamia dates back to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. By emphasizing the concepts of self-government, motherland, and historical and spiritual bonds with the land, this point contributes to the important distinction between ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples clarified in international law.     

Conclusion

The findings indicate that the principles of indigeneity constitute the core claims of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey. More importantly, they identify themselves as "kadim halk" with a strong emphasis on their ethnic identity, unique language and culture, historical homeland, and demands for self-determination. The Kurdish movement advocates not only for the rights of Kurds, also for other unrecognized peoples of Anatolia and Mesopotamia. The current pro-Kurdish party in Turkey’s parliament is the only political party that officially refers to the ‘peoples’ instead of the ‘people’ of Turkey. The party does not only include this pluralism in its title but also in practice concerning self-representation in exchanges with Assyrian, Yezidi, Armenian, Turk, Arab and Mhallami deputies. 

In terms of both demands and definition, the Kurdish movement and indigenous movements have much in common. Neither of them wants to be identified as an ethnic minority, identifying their unique identity, culture, language and spiritual connection to their ancestral lands. Also, they have been fighting for self-determination despite the oppression, marginalization and denials they have suffered from host countries. 

There is no doubt that these rights set out in international law are very important for indigenous peoples around the world, along with the Kurds, who have been struggling for self-determination for more than a century. 

NOTES

1. Oxford Learner’s Dictionary, 2022, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/ethnicity?q=ethnicity

2. Kingsbury, Benedict. (1998) ‘Indigenous peoples in international law: A constructivist approach to the Asian controversy, in C. Erni, C. (end.), The American Journal of International Law, 92(3), pp. 414-457. 

3. Roy, Alpana. (2008) ‘Postcolonial theory and law: a critical introduction', Adelaide Law Review, 29(2), pp. 315. Available at: SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2620107

4. Trigger, David.S. and Dalley, Cameo. (2010) ‘Negotiating Indigeneity: Culture, Identity, and Politics’, Reviews in Anthropology, 39(1), pp.46-65.

5. Weaver, Jace. (2008) ‘Indigenousness and Indigeneity’, in Schwarz, H. and Ray, S. (eds), A Companion to Postcolonial Studies, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 221- 235.

6. United Nations , (2022), United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2018/11/UNDRIP_E_web.pdf

7. Bennet, Mark J. Bennett (2005) 'Indigeneity' as Self-Determination’, Indigenous Law Journal, 4(5), pp. 72-115. 

8. Kuper, Adam. (2003) ‘The return of the native’, Current Anthropology, 44 (3), pp. 389- 402.

9. Weaver, Jace. (2008) ‘Indigenousness and Indigeneity’, in Schwarz, H. and Ray, S. (eds), A Companion to Postcolonial Studies, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 221- 235.

10. Gunes, Cengiz. (2012) The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to Resistance, Exeter Studies in Ethno Politics. London and New York: Routledge. 

11. Gunter, Michael M. (2018) Routledge Handbook on the Kurds. Abingdon: Routledge.

12. Leezenberg, Michiel. (2016) ‘The ambiguities of democratic autonomy: the Kurdish movement in Turkey and Rojava’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 16(4), pp. 671-690. 

13. Bozarslan, Hamit. (2000), ‘Why the armed Struggle? Understanding the Violence in Kurdistan of Turkey’, in Ibrahim, F. and Gürbey, G. (eds), The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy, Münster: LIT Verlag, pp.17-25.

14. Constitution Of the Republic Of Turkey, 2018, https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf

15. Beşikçi, İsmail.  (1977) Kürtlerin 'mecburi iskânı’. Ankara: Komal.

16. Watts, Nicole F. (1999) ‘Allies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics, 1990- 94’. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 31(4), p.632. 

17. Halkların Demokratik Partisi Program [Peoples’ Democracy Party Program] (2022). Available at: https://hdp.org.tr/tr/parti-programi/8/  

18. Unal, Aynur.  (2022) Self-Identification of Indigeneity within Turkey’s Kurdish Political Movement, Middle East Critique, DOI: 10.1080/19436149.2022.2092669

19. Author Interview with Lezgin Botan of the HDP, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Ankara, 23 January 2018. 

20. Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1992) Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.51

21. Fishman, Joshua A. (1972) Language and nationalism: two integrative essays. Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House Publishers, p.44. 

22. Unal, Aynur. (2021). Beyond Mother Language: Kurdish as a Regional and Indigenous Language. The Journal of Mesopotamian Studies , 6 (2) , pp. 245-265.  DOI: 10.35859/jms.2021.963478

23. Grin, François and Kymlicka, Will. (2003) ‘Assessing the politics of diversity in transition countries”, in Daftary et, F. and F. Grin, F. (eds.), Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries. Budapest: LGI Books, p.11. 

24. Author Interview with İmam Taşçıer of the HDP , The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Ankara, 21 February 2018. 

25. Halkların Demokratik Partisi Program [Peoples’ Democracy Party Program] (2022). Available at: https://hdp.org.tr/tr/parti-programi/8/

26. Hodgson, Dorothy L. (2002) ‘In Focus: Indigenous Rights Movements, Introduction: Comparative Perspective on the Indigenous Rights Movement in Africa and the Americas’, American Anthropologist, 104(4), pp. 1037–1049

27. Korff, Jens. (2019), Australian Aboriginal artists. Available at: https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/arts/australian-aboriginalartists

28. Author Interview with Deputy Ali Atalan of the HDP, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Ankara, 8 February 2018. 

29. Author Interview with Deputy Sibel Yiğitalp of the HDP, HDP Headquarters, Ankara, 17 February 2018.  

30. Stanner, William Edward Hanley. (1969) The Boyer Lectures 1968 – After the Dreaming. Sydney, NSW: Australian Broadcasting Commission.

31. Gerber, Damian and Brincat, Shannon.  (2018) ‘When Öcalan met Bookchin: The Kurdish Freedom Movement and the Political Theory of Democratic Confederalism’, Geopolitics. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2018.1508016

32. Knapp, Michael, and Joost Jongerden. (2016). “Communal Democracy: The Social Contract and Confederalism in Rojava”. Comparative Islamic Studies, 10 (1), pp. 87-109. 

33. Akkaya, Ahmet Hamdi and Jongerden, Joost. (2011) ‘The PKK in the 2000s: Continuity through breaks?’ in Casier, M. and Jongerden, J. (eds.) Nationalisms and politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue. New York: Routledge, pp.143-162

34. Author Interview with Deputy Alican Önlü of the HDP, HDP Headquarters, Ankara, 17 February 2018. 

35. Author Interview with Deputy Ahmet Yıldırım of the HDP, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Ankara, 18 January 2018. 

36. Author Interview with Deputy Mehment Emin Adiyaman, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Ankara, 29 January 2018.