It is now clear that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which has met annually in the Conference of the Parties (COP) for the past three decades, is not on track to meet the climate change goals set out in the 2015 Paris Agreement to keep global warming well below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels, and possibly below 1.5ºC. [1] In fact, global emissions from fossil fuel use reached a record 37.4 GtCO2 in 2024.  At this rate, in January 2025, we are only six years away from exhausting the greenhouse gas emissions budget consistent (with a 50% probability) with the 1.5ºC mitigation target. [2] And the fact that the new Trump administration in the US, the world's second largest emitter and leading economy, is preparing to remove all restrictions on the exploitation of US fossil fuel reserves and has ordered the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (for the second time) clearly does not bode well for the future of the climate. [3]

The last COP29, held in Baku in November 2024, was dubbed the “finance COP”. [4]  In fact, its main purpose was to reach an international agreement on the so-called New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance for the post-2025 period. Climate finance in this case means what should more accurately be called international climate finance. [5] The latter term refers to all those cross-border economic flows that are directly derived from and/or triggered by public finance, that are earmarked for climate action and that meet three criteria. First, the economic flows must be from developed to developing countries. In the UNFCCC categorisation, developed countries are 23 high-income countries belonging to the so-called global north. Developing countries, on the other hand, are mainly those usually categorised as the global south. Second, the economic flows must be new and additional, both to the money that developed countries should be providing to developing countries on the basis of other international commitments on foreign direct aid, and to the money that developed countries would be providing to developing countries anyway, e.g. on the basis of already planned projects and/or investments. Third, there must be a "sacrifice" on the part of the contributing countries, or in other words, the contributing countries must give the recipient countries something that the latter could not obtain on market terms: grants, of course, but also concessional loans, and also private finance mobilised through public finance (e.g. when the latter shields private actors from the risks associated with investing their own money). [6]

International climate finance is only one of the two ways in which countries should meet their climate responsibilities. It is a global redistribution of economic resources that serves both to facilitate mitigation and adaptation in poorer countries that cannot rely solely on their public budgets for climate action, and to hold developed countries accountable for historical climate injustice. But focusing on international climate finance alone is not enough. Both developed and developing countries need to adopt ambitious and coordinated carbon pricing policies to promote an inclusive climate transition, and then use carbon revenues (along with other public funds) in a way that also makes pricing fair. Currently, however, less than a third of global emissions are covered by carbon pricing policies, and in most cases at rates that are insufficient to meet the Paris mitigation targets. [7] The COP has so far dealt unsatisfactorily with the issue of international climate finance and has never really addressed the issue of carbon pricing. The main reason for this is that the COP, based as it is on a logic of voluntarism and unanimity, is ill-suited to negotiating green fiscal policies. A group of committed countries setting an ambitious carbon price floor and exerting pressure, including trade penalties, on other countries to do the same, is the last hope of keeping climate change under control. [8] Yet this is made all the more difficult by the fact that the US will definitely not be part of this group, at least for the next four years.

1. Why COP29 failed to deliver climate justice

According to the third report of the UN-mandated High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, developing countries (excluding China) will need $1.3 trillion per year in cross-border finance by 2035, on top of what they can mobilise domestically, for Paris-consistent mitigation, adaptation, climate-related disaster response and conservation of climate-threatened nature. [9] 

There are several normative reasons why the $1.3 trillion target should be met by developed countries on a predominantly concessional basis, i.e. with grants rather than loans or private investment. Developed countries, now home to less than a third of the world's population, have historically consumed more than half of the emissions budget compatible with the 1.5ºC mitigation target. [10] And they have also consumed a large share of the products produced in developing countries' factories, whose emissions have been counted in those countries' accounts. [11] As a result of the depletion of the emissions budget, many people living in developing countries now see their prima facie moral right to pursue a path of rapid economic development based on the exploitation of fossil fuels, just as developed countries did years before, as coming into conflict with the global responsibility to avoid a climate catastrophe. This implies a duty on the part of developed countries to rectify the injustice in the distribution of the emissions budget – on the reasonable assumption that no human being has a greater moral right than any other to draw from a global commons such as the atmospheric capacity to absorb CO2. [12] Moreover, the emissions accumulated in the atmosphere to date have caused extreme atmospheric phenomena and changes in the Earth's systems, of which the developing countries are the main victims, both for geographical and socio-economic reasons. This places a duty on developed countries to compensate for harm. [13]

It could be argued that the duty to compensate for the harm associated with past emissions is mitigated by the fact that many people in the past were morally excusable for their emissions because they could not reasonably have understood the causal link between the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere and global warming. And even if these people were to be held responsible for past emissions, despite their ignorance of their climatic effects, they would not be here today to shoulder their responsibilities – and so it would be unwarranted to ask their descendants to pick up the slack. [14] Nevertheless, there are at least three argumentative strategies that can explain why people living in developed countries today must provide economic resources to people living in developing countries to deal with the harm caused by historical emissions attributable to the people living in developed countries in the past. 

First, some advocate a strict liability approach to responsibility for past emissions (strict liability is a feature of many legal systems). According to this view, even if past persons are not morally culpable for their emissions, they must remedy the resulting damage for the simple reason that they caused it. [15] Second, even if one were to accept the argument that in the absence of moral responsibility for emissions there can be no compensatory responsibility, it should be noted that the benefits of past emissions by developed countries have mainly accrued to people living in those same countries today. The current inhabitants of developed countries would therefore become accomplices, or at least acquiescers, in the injustice of past emissions if they did not renounce the unjust benefits they now derive from those same emissions. [16] Third, even if no one were to compensate anyone for past emissions, the fact that developing countries do not have sufficient resources to cope with climate-related losses, while developed countries do, imposes a positive duty of justice on the latter to provide the former with the resources they need. [17]

The “finance COP” failed to hold developed countries to their climate justice responsibilities as described above, because it allowed them to get away without committing to any concessional and new-and-additional redistribution of resources for climate action that meets the real needs of developing countries. The COP29 decision on climate finance states that the Parties recognise the importance of providing $1.3 trillion per year to developing countries for climate action by 2035. [18] At the same time, however, the Parties call on developed countries to mobilise only $300 billion per year by 2035, from both public and private sources, for developing countries. [19] This $300 billion figure pales in comparison to the climate responsibilities of developed countries and the money needed by developing countries to address the climate threats caused by developed countries. Moreover, the Parties have not made it sufficiently clear that the $300 billion is to be taken at grant equivalent rather than face value. There is therefore a risk that, for example, a developed country providing a concessional loan of X to a developing country will want to count the full amount of X as part of its contribution to the $300 billion target, rather than the difference between the interest rate at which the developing country could have obtained X on the market and the interest rate provided by the developed country. [20]

As for the gap between the $1.3 trillion and the $300 billion figures, the Parties stipulate that this should be covered by all countries, not just developed countries, and through both public and private finance. [21] This raises several problems that undermine developing countries' rights to climate justice. Indeed, much of the gap can be filled by non-concessional loans and private investment. Loans risk putting additional debt pressure on already heavily indebted low-income countries that are victims of climate injustice and simply have a right to have that injustice redressed. [22] Private investment, in turn, is expected to flow mainly into the renewable energy sector in low- and middle-income countries. On the one hand, this means under-investment in climate adaptation, which is unlikely to generate significant profit margins for investors. [23] On the other hand, it creates an opportunity for historical polluters to enrich themselves by solving climate problems in developing countries that they have largely contributed to.

2. Why climate finance is not enough, and we need to put a price on greenhouse gas emissions

There is a second level of analysis that is unfortunately often overlooked in the public narrative of the COPs. This has to do with the distinction, central to the climate justice debate, between backward-looking and forward-looking climate justice. Backward-looking climate justice refers to the moral obligations of those who have polluted the most so far to redress the distributive injustices resulting from the overuse of the emissions budget and to compensate for the associated climate damage – the same obligations may also apply, as we have seen, to those who have benefited the most from past emissions and/or to those who have the greatest capacity to mobilise resources to address the negative impacts of past emissions. The main beneficiaries will be those who have polluted the least and those who are most vulnerable to climate threats (these two categories tend to coincide in most cases). Forward-looking climate justice, on the other hand, refers to the moral obligations of people today to do all they can to prevent global warming from getting worse, so that, among other things, people in the future can live in a decent world. [24] International climate finance should be seen as a way for developed countries to meet their backward-looking obligations of climate justice. Certainly, providing developing countries with economic and technological resources that can be used, inter alia, to mitigate climate change would also make it easier for developing countries to meet their forward-looking obligations of climate justice. But international climate finance is not a way to make developed countries stop polluting. In other words, international climate finance can serve to correct, at least in part, the climate injustice that has been perpetrated so far, of which people in developing countries have been the main victims. However, it will not end the climate injustice that is still being perpetrated today, to the detriment (above all) of future generations. [25]

One way to explore the issue further is to ask what would happen if developed countries committed to provide new and additional concessional finance to cover the full share of the costs of climate action that developing countries cannot meet on their own, or even more. Developing countries would receive a significant amount of funding, much of which they would use for climate action. This would be ensured, at least in practice, by mobilising these flows through international institutions or funds, which would require project submission, accreditation, verification, etc. Would this be enough to bring emissions from developing countries to a peak and then to a rapid decline, despite continued population growth in many of these countries, the expanding needs of a new global middle class living in the global south, and so on? This is a difficult question to answer precisely because it depends on a number of empirical variables that are difficult to control. For example, it is not necessarily the case that investing in the energy efficiency of certain appliances leads to a reduction in their emissions; in fact, increasing the energy efficiency of an appliance (e.g. cars, air conditioners, etc.) may make it cheaper to use and thus encourage consumers to use it more, with no impact on emissions. [26] Moreover, even if international climate finance were sufficient to achieve large-scale decarbonisation in developing countries, it would take time. And time, as we've seen, is something we don't have much of if we really want to meet the Paris climate goals.

From the perspective of developed countries, however, international climate finance is just a cost. There is no hope that the fact that a country is paying its climate justice debt will induce it to implement effective decarbonisation domestically. On the contrary, it is reasonable to expect that those who have been taxed to facilitate climate action abroad will be less inclined to give up cheap fossil energy at home, or at least what is perceived or said to be so. This is why the majority of experts believe that the only way for people today to fulfil their forward-looking obligations of climate justice is through carbon pricing policies. These policies need to be ambitious and coordinated across countries, regardless of their level of development (any equity issues can be addressed ex-post). [27]

Carbon pricing is a policy whereby a public authority imposes a tax on anyone within its jurisdiction who emits CO2 (or, more generally, greenhouse gases, converted into CO2 equivalents). The carbon price should be “at least” equal to the so-called social cost of carbon, i.e. the estimated economic value of the damage that a marginal unit of CO2 causes to society as a whole, for example in terms of health effects, industrial production, agriculture, etc. I say “at least” because, according to some, a carbon price equivalent to the social cost of CO2 would be too low to meet the mitigation targets of the Paris Agreement and should therefore be set even higher. [28]  Carbon pricing delivers three effects that are essential to achieving the rapid climate transition we need if we are to respect the right to a decent life of future generations. And thanks to a fourth effect, the first three do not impose unsustainable burdens on people today, especially the most vulnerable. First, an ambitious carbon price induces an immediate reduction in overall emissions. This is because it creates a strong economic incentive to choose green energy or even to reduce consumption. Second, carbon pricing ensures that emissions reductions are achieved at the lowest possible cost to society. In effect, carbon pricing does not determine who should emit and who should not. It simply provides an economic incentive (negative, of course). The assumption is that those with marginal abatement costs lower than the carbon price will choose to reduce their emissions, and those with marginal abatement costs higher than the carbon price will choose to pay the carbon price. And, of course, it is then up to the government to redistribute the benefits of socially efficient abatement fairly among the various actors. Third, carbon pricing encourages those who have capital to shift it into the development of green technologies and solutions that will further reduce emissions in the near future (with the economic benefit of paying less carbon taxes accruing to those who will control these technologies). Fourth, unlike supply-side policies or regulations that tend to enrich energy companies, or public subsidies that burden public finances and in many cases increases public debt, carbon pricing generates public revenues. These can be used to protect the poorest from carbon price-induced inflation, or even as an income redistribution tool. [29]

3. A climate club in the midst of the Trump storm?

I have argued that the COP has so far only addressed the issue of climate justice from the perspective of international climate finance, and inadequately so. But even if developed countries did more on this front and accepted their full responsibility for the climate change they have caused so far, this would not be enough to prevent global warming from getting worse and thus guarantee future generations the right to live in a reasonably healthy environment. For this to happen, as many countries as possible would need to adopt carbon pricing policies.

Yet the COP works by unanimity and consensus, and it is not the place to discuss the coordination of a policy as divisive as taxation. This is why, in recent years, many have advocated the idea of a climate club to complement the COP. [30] There are different versions of a climate club, but the one we are interested in here is the so-called "transformational" climate club, i.e. the climate club that changes the incentive structure for countries to mitigate climate change. A quick definition of a transformational climate club is this: A more or less small group of countries, inevitably including the big emitters, that get together, agree on a carbon price floor, and then introduce a penalty for non-members, e.g. a tax on imports, or only on emissions embedded in imports. [31] The economic rationale behind this idea is that it is possible to model a climate club based on a trade tariff (e.g. 5% tariff on all imports regardless of their emissions) and a carbon price floor (e.g. $50 per tonne of CO2) in such a way that if a certain number of large economies (e.g. EU and US, plus possibly China) join the club, it becomes self-reinforcing, i.e. other countries would want to pay the entry fee (adopt the carbon price) to enjoy the benefits of membership (exemption from the trade tariff). [32]

It has been argued that the last four years have been a window of opportunity for the formation of a climate club. This is because the US, the EU and China were all politically attuned to spending large amounts of public money on the climate agenda. [33] But the Biden administration in the US did not play ball. The EU did indeed legislate for higher carbon prices on a range of carbon-intensive goods (although the effects have yet to be felt) and introduced a carbon border adjustment mechanism, i.e. a tariff on the emissions embedded in those carbon-intensive goods when imported from countries that do not have carbon pricing policies (or other policies with equivalent effects) comparable to those of the EU. [34] All the US would have had to do was follow suit. Then we would have had a transatlantic climate club that emerging economies like China would have been hard-pressed to join, precisely to avoid carbon taxation at the border. This, in turn, could have had the snowball effect envisioned by the proponents of the climate club. Instead, the Biden administration spent enormous resources, some would say imprudently, on tax credits and subsidies for green companies. [35] These policy instruments have not had a mitigation effect even comparable to that of an ambitious carbon price, for two main reasons. 

First, subsidies may succeed in changing production and consumption practices in specific sectors, but these positive results do not necessarily spill over from one sector to another, and thus to the whole economic system. For example, subsidies that encourage a certain number of people to switch to electric cars will not be very effective in reducing emissions if energy producers are not incentivised to make the energy grid fit for net-zero emissions. Carbon pricing, on the other hand, pushes all sectors to reduce their emissions in a coordinated manner and immediately. Second, subsidies have a narrow time horizon. This is not enough to induce producers to radically redirect their investments towards greener technologies. Carbon pricing, on the other hand, could induce this radical change by promising large long-term savings to those who innovate seriously. [36] Nevertheless, the Biden administration has chosen to focus on subsidies for the simple reason that spending is more politically palatable than taxing, [37] even though taxing may be less burdensome than spending for a large segment of the population, the less affluent (thanks to a targeted redistribution of carbon revenues). As a result, US greenhouse gas emissions fell by only 0.2% between 2023 and 2024. [38] 

The next few years will be critical for climate change. If global CO2 emissions do not fall significantly, the Paris goals will be officially declared a failure. On the one hand, new, less ambitious mitigation targets would have to be negotiated internationally. On the other hand, the failure to meet the initial targets could make many countries sceptical about having global mitigation targets at all. Faced with dramatic evidence of a sinking boat and a lack of solutions, some may be tempted to muddle through as best they can.

Clearly, the chances of a Trump-led US moving forward with a climate club after withdrawing from the Paris Agreement are slim to none. The absence of the US as the initiating country of a climate club is not decisive for its failure. The US could be brought in at a later date, perhaps even after domestic political changes. And even if the US stays out, a climate club launched by the EU, a group of other developed countries and emerging economies would have a significant impact on climate change. [39] But the problem is political. The lack of a US presence reduces the motivation for other potential climate club initiators to take the first step.  

The last slim hope of breaking the climate deadlock in which we find ourselves, and thus avoiding a serious worsening of the climate crisis, lies in an unfortunately unlikely climate alliance between the EU and emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, etc., in a venue other than the COP. The governments of these countries, as well as their respective electorates, should look beyond narrow self-interest and reduce their emissions through ambitious and coordinated mitigation policies – preferably by synchronising carbon prices. Thus triggering a chain mechanism that could also have an effect on the western shore of the Atlantic, if not now in the near future. But this requires a serious and clear-headed reflection on what has not worked at the policy level and what could work instead. And it is equally important to start communicating the different policy options in the right way, dispelling false myths in public opinion that are sometimes instrumental for vested interests to get their way. [40]

Conclusions

In this short article I made three claims. First, the "finance COP" failed on climate justice because the Parties did not commit to meeting the economic needs of developing countries for climate action in a concessional way. This is incompatible with any reasonable normative principle of fair climate burden sharing. Second, even if developed countries were to provide developing countries with the money they need for climate action on a concessional basis, this would not be enough to halt the worsening of climate change and thus guarantee the right of future generations to live in a reasonably healthy environment. For this to happen, as many countries as possible, especially the big emitters, need to form a climate club, i.e. agree on a carbon price floor and pressure other countries to do the same, even with negative incentives such as trade tariffs. Third, we have missed a great opportunity to form a climate club in recent years, when the political conditions were favourable. Given the recent political fallout, forming a climate club is now very difficult, but not impossible. A good start would be to ensure that the public debate focuses on the trade-offs between different policy options for mitigating climate change, and that the pros and cons of each are communicated in a clear and unbiased way.

The author received funding from the European Union's Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101109449 (PROHIBLUX). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the REA can be held responsible for them.

NOTES

1. The Club of Rome. “An open letter to the UN Secretary General and COP Executive Secretary” (2024). https://www.clubofrome.org/cop-reform/ . See also UNFCCC. The Paris Agreement (2016): Art. 2. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/parisagreement_publication.pdf 

2. Global Carbon Project. Global Carbon Budget 2024. 2024. https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-2024-519 

3. M. McGrath, “Trump vows to leave Paris climate agreement and 'drill, baby, drill'”. BBC. January 21 (2025). https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20px1e05w0o 

4. UN News. “COP29: Push for agreement on a new climate finance deal ‘right from the start’”. November 11 (2024). https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1156776 

5. J. Gabbatiss, “COP29: What is the ‘new collective quantified goal’ on climate finance?”. CarbonBrief. November 4 (2024). https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop29-what-is-the-new-collective-quantified-goal-on-climate-finance/ 

6. A. Michaelowa & A.-K. Sacherer, “Introduction to the Handbook of International Climate Finance: is climate finance a meteoric fashion or a stable pillar of the global response to anthropogenic climate change?”. Handbook of International Climate Finance. A. Michaelowa and A.-K. Sacherer. Cheltenham, UK – Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2022. 1-15; Gordon, N.J. (2023). “Climate Finance: An Overview”.  Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, Vol. 65 No.4 (2024): 18-26. https://doi.org/10.1080/00139157.2023.2205347 

7. World Bank. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2024. 2024. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/b0d66765-299c-4fb8-921f-61f6bb979087 

8. J. Hovi, D. F. Sprinz, H. Sælen, & A. Underdal, “The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate Co-Operation?”. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49 No. 3 (2019): 1071–96. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000788.

9. High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance. Raising ambition and accelerating delivery of climate finance. November 14, 2024. https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/publication/raising-ambition-and-accelerating-delivery-of-climate-finance/  

10. H. Ritchie, “Who has contributed most to global CO2 emissions?”. OurWorldinData (2019). https://ourworldindata.org/contributed-most-global-co2

11. H. Ritchie, How do CO2 emissions compare when we adjust for trade?” OurWorldinData (2019). https://ourworldindata.org/consumption-based-co2 

12. H. Shue, The Pivotal Generation: Why We Have a Moral Responsibility to Slow Climate Change Right Now. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021; pp. 36-42

13. M. Blomfield, “V—Who is Responsible for the Climate Change Problem?”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 123 No. 2 (2023): 126–149 (see129-132). https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoad008 

14. E. Kingston, “Climate Justice and Temporally Remote Emissions”. Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 40 No. 2 (2014): 281-303. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201440217 

15. E. Neumayer, “In Defence of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions”. Ecological Economics, Vol. 33 No. 2 (2000): 185–192. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009(00)00135-X 

16. E. Page, “Give it up for climate change: a defence of the beneficiary pays principle”. International Theory, Vol. 4 No. 2 (2012): 300–330. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297191200005X. 

17. D. Moellendorf, “Climate change and global justice”. WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 3 No. 2 (2012): 131-143 (see 136-137). https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.158 

18. UNFCCC. “Matters relating to finance: New collective quantified goal on climate finance – Draft decision -/CMA.6” (2024): Art. 7. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2024_L22_adv.pdf

19. UNFCCC, cit., Art. 8.

20. Oxfam. “Climate Finance Shadow Report 2023: Assessing the delivery of the $100 billion commitment” (2023), pp. 12-13. https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/climate-finance-shadow-report-2023-621500/ 

21. UNFCCC, cit., Art. 7.

22. N. Alayza, V. Laxton, & C. Neunuebel, “Developing Countries Won’t Beat the Climate Crisis Without Tackling Rising Debt”. World Resources Institute. September 22 (2023). https://www.wri.org/insights/debt-climate-action-developing-countries 

23. UNEP. Adaptation Gap Report (2024); pp. 41-62. https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2024 

24. H. Shue, “Responsible for what? Carbon producer CO2 contributions and the energy transition”. Climatic Change, Vol. 144 (2017): 591–596 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-017-2042-9 

25. F. Corvino, “The forward-looking polluter pays principle for a just climate transition”. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, online first (2023): 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2243729 

26. P. Brockway & S. Sorrell, “Guest post: Why ‘rebound effects’ may cut energy savings in half”. CarbonBrief. March 2 (2021). https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-why-rebound-effects-may-cut-energy-savings-in-half/ 

27. M. A. Drupp, F. Nesje & R. C. Schmidt, “Pricing Carbon: Evidence from Expert Recommendations”. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 16 No. 4 (2024): 68–99. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20220571

28. N. Stern & J. Stiglitz, “Getting the Social Cost of Carbon Right”. Project Syndicate, 15 February (2021). https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/biden-administration-climate-change-higher-carbon-price-by-nicholas-stern-and-joseph-e-stiglitz-2021-02?referral=1d5110 

29. J. K. Boyce, “Carbon Pricing: Effectiveness and Equity”. Ecological Economics, Vol. 150 (2018): 52-61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.030 

30. H. Pihl, “A Climate Club as a complementary design to the UN Paris agreement”. Policy Design and Practice Vol. 3 No. 1 (2020): 45-57. https://doi.org/10.1080/25741292.2019.1710911 ; Nordhaus, W. “The Climate Club”.  Foreign Affairs, April 10 (2020). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-10/climate-club

31. R. Falkner, N. Nasiritousi & G. Reischl, “Climate clubs: politically feasible and desirable?”. Climate Policy, Vol. 22 No. 4: 480–487 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2021.1967717 . The only climate club that currently exists is not transformational, as it has no membership fees or significant membership benefits. It is more of a forum where member countries can share assessments and best practices. See https://climate-club.org/ 

32. W. Nordhaus, “Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy”. American Economic Review, Vol. 105 No. 4 (2015): 1339–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.15000001 

33. S. Tagliapietra & G. B. Wolff, “Conditions are ideal for a new climate club”. Energy Policy, Vol. 158 (2021): 112527. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112527 

34. L. Tamellini, “FAQ: The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)”. Carbon Market Watch. July 30 (2024). https://carbonmarketwatch.org/2024/07/30/faq-the-eu-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-cbam/ 

35. H. M. Jr. Paulson & E. B. Bowles, “Biden should embrace a carbon tax”. The Washington Post. May 10 (2021). https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/paulson-bowles-biden-carbon-tax/2021/05/10/2230cda4-af62-11eb-b476-c3b287e52a01_story.html 

36. J. E. Aldy, D. Burtraw, C., Fischer, M. Fowlie, R. C. Williams & M. L. Cropper, “How Is the U.S. Pricing Carbon? How Could We Price Carbon?”. Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, Vol. 13 No. 3 (2022): 310–34. https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2022.19 

37. B. Plumer, “Biden Wants to Slash Emissions. Success Would Mean a Very Different America”. The New York Times. April 22 (2021). https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/22/climate/biden-emissions-target-economy.html 

38. M. Lempriere, “US emissions ‘unchanged’ in 2024 despite coal power at lowest level since 1967”. CarbonBrief. January 9 (2025). https://www.carbonbrief.org/us-emissions-unchanged-in-2024-despite-coal-power-at-lowest-level-since-1967/ 

39. D. F. Sprinz, H. Sælen, A. Underdal & J. Hovi, “The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump”. Climate Policy, Vol. 18 No. 7 (2018): 828-838. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2017.1410090 

40. E. M. Gilbert, “Five myths about carbon pricing”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 39 No. 4: 680–693. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grad042